Performative Prediction by Perdomo, Juan C. et al.
Performative Prediction
Juan C. Perdomo* Tijana Zrnic* Celestine Mendler-Dünner Moritz Hardt
{jcperdomo, tijana.zrnic, mendler, hardt}@berkeley.edu
University of California, Berkeley
June 17, 2020
Abstract
When predictions support decisions they may influence the outcome they aim to predict.
We call such predictions performative; the prediction influences the target. Performativity is
a well-studied phenomenon in policy-making that has so far been neglected in supervised
learning. When ignored, performativity surfaces as undesirable distribution shift, routinely
addressed with retraining.
We develop a risk minimization framework for performative prediction bringing together
concepts from statistics, game theory, and causality. A conceptual novelty is an equilibrium
notion we call performative stability. Performative stability implies that the predictions are
calibrated not against past outcomes, but against the future outcomes that manifest from
acting on the prediction. Our main results are necessary and sufficient conditions for the
convergence of retraining to a performatively stable point of nearly minimal loss.
In full generality, performative prediction strictly subsumes the setting known as strategic
classification. We thus also give the first sufficient conditions for retraining to overcome
strategic feedback effects.
1 Introduction
Supervised learning excels at pattern recognition. When used to support consequential deci-
sions, however, predictive models can trigger actions that influence the outcome they aim to
predict. We call such predictions performative; the prediction causes a change in the distribution
of the target variable.
Consider a simplified example of predicting credit default risk. A bank might estimate that
a loan applicant has an elevated risk of default, and will act on it by assigning a high interest
rate. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, the high interest rate further increases the customer's default
risk. Put differently, the bank's predictive model is not calibrated to the outcomes that manifest
from acting on the model.
Once recognized, performativity turns out to be ubiquitous. Traffic predictions influence
traffic patterns, crime location prediction influences police allocations that may deter crime,
recommendations shape preferences and thus consumption, stock price prediction determines
trading activity and hence prices.
* Equal contribution.
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When ignored, performativity can surface as a form of distribution shift. As the decision-
maker acts according to a predictive model, the distribution over data points appears to change
over time. In practice, the response to such distribution shifts is to frequently retrain the
predictive model as more data becomes available. Retraining is often considered an undesired —
yet necessary — cat and mouse game of chasing a moving target.
What would be desirable from the perspective of the decision maker is a certain equilibrium
where the model is optimal for the distribution it induces. Such equilibria coincide with the
stable points of retraining, that is, models invariant under retraining. Performativity therefore
suggests a different perspective on retraining, exposing it as a natural equilibrating dynamic
rather than a nuisance.
This raises fundamental questions. When do such stable points exist? How can we efficiently
find them? Under what conditions does retraining converge? When do stable points also have
good predictive performance? In this work, we formalize performative prediction, tying together
conceptual elements from statistical decision theory, causal reasoning, and game theory. We
then resolve some of the fundamental questions that performativity raises.
1.1 Our contributions
We put performativity at the center of a decision-theoretic framework that extends the classical
statistical theory underlying risk minimization. The goal of risk minimization is to find a
decision rule, specified by model parameters θ, that performs well on a fixed joint distributionD
over covariates X and an outcome variable Y .
Whenever predictions are performative, the choice of predictive model affects the observed
distribution over instances Z = (X,Y ). We formalize this intuitive notion by introducing a
map D(·) from the set of model parameters to the space of distributions. For a given choice of
parameters θ, we think of D(θ) as the distribution over features and outcomes that results from
making decisions according to the model specified by θ. This mapping from predictive model
to distribution is the key conceptual device of our framework.
A natural objective in performative prediction is to evaluate model parameters θ on the
resulting distribution D(θ) as measured via a loss function `. This results in the notion we call
performative risk, defined as
PR(θ) = E
Z∼D(θ)
`(Z;θ) .
The difficulty in minimizing PR(θ) is that the distribution itself depends on the argument θ,
a dependence that defeats traditional theory for risk minimization. Moreover, we generally
envision that the map D(·) is unknown to the decision maker.
Perhaps the most natural algorithmic heuristic in this situation is a kind of fixed point
iteration: repeatedly find a model that minimizes risk on the distribution resulting from the
previous model, corresponding to the update rule
θt+1 = argmin
θ
E
Z∼D(θt)
`(Z;θ) .
We call this procedure repeated risk minimization. We also analyze its empirical counterpart that
works in finite samples. These procedures exemplify a family of retraining heuristics that are
ubiquitous in practice for dealing with all kinds of distributions shifts irrespective of cause.
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When repeated risk minimization converges in objective value the model has minimal loss
on the distribution it entails:
PR(θ) = min
θ
E
Z∼D(θ)
`(Z;θ) .
We refer to this condition as performative stability, noting that it is neither implied by nor does it
imply minimal performative risk.
Our central result can be summarized informally as follows.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). If the loss is smooth, strongly convex, and the mapping D(·) is sufficiently
Lipschitz, then repeated risk minimization converges to performative stability at a linear rate.
Moreover, if any one of these assumptions does not hold, repeated risk minimization can fail to
converge at all.
The notion of Lipschitz continuity here refers to the Euclidean distance on model parameters
and the Wasserstein distance on distributions. Informally, it requires that a small change in
model parameters θ does not have an outsized effect on the induced distribution D(θ).
In contrast to standard supervised learning, convexity alone is not sufficient for convergence
in objective value, even if the other assumptions hold. Performative prediction therefore gives a
new and interesting perspective on the importance of strong convexity.
Strong convexity has a second benefit. Not only does retraining converge to a stable point at
a linear rate, this stable point also approximately minimizes the performative risk.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). If the loss is Lipschitz and strongly convex, and the map D(·) is Lipschitz,
all stable points and performative optima lie in a small neighborhood around each other.
Recall that performative stability on its own does not imply minimal performative risk.
What the previous theorem shows, however, is that strong convexity guarantees that we can
approximately satisfy both.
We complement our main results with a case study in strategic classification. Strategic
classification aims to anticipate a strategic response to a classifier from an individual, who can
change their features prior to being classified. We observe that strategic classification is a special
case of performative prediction. On the one hand, this allows us to transfer our technical results
to this established setting. In particular, our results are the first to give a guarantee on repeated
risk minimization in the strategic setting. On the other hand, strategic classification provides
us with one concrete setting for what the mapping D(·) can be. We use this as a basis of an
empirical evaluation in a semi-synthetic setting, where the initial distribution is based on a real
data set, but the distribution map is modeled.
1.2 Related work
Performativity is a broad concept in the social sciences, philosophy, and economics [30, 18].
Below we focus on the relationship of our work to the most relevant technical scholarship.
Learning on non-stationary distributions. A closely related line of work considers the prob-
lem of concept drift, broadly defined as the problem of learning when the target distribution
over instances drifts with time. This setting has attracted attention both in the learning theory
community [27, 3, 2] and by machine learning practitioners [14].
Concept drift is more general phenomenon than performativity in that it considers arbitrary
sources of shift. However, studying the problem at this level of generality has led to a number
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of difficulties in creating a unified language and objective [14, 39], an issue we circumvent by
assuming that the population distribution is determined by the deployed classifier. Importantly,
this line of work also discusses the importance of retraining [40, 14]. However, it stops short of
discussing the need for stability or analyzing the long-term behavior of retraining.
Strategic classification. Strategic classification recognizes that individuals often adapt to the
specifics of a decision rule so as to gain an advantage (see, e.g., [11, 8, 15, 24]). Recent work
in this area considers issues of incentive design [25, 31, 36, 4], control over an algorithm [10],
and fairness concerns [20, 32]. Importantly, the concurrent work of Bechavod et al. [4] analyzes
the implications of retraining in the context of causal discovery in linear models. Our model
of performative prediction includes all notions of strategic adaption that we are aware of as
a special case. Unlike many works in this area, our results do not depend on a specific cost
function for changing individual features. Rather, we rely on an assumption about the sensitivity
of the data-generating distribution to changes in the model parameters.
Recently, there has been increased interest within the algorithmic fairness community in
classification dynamics. See, for example, Liu et al. [28], Hu and Chen [19], and Hashimoto et
al. [17]. The latter work considers repeated risk minimization, but from the perspective of what
it does to a measure of disparity between groups.
Causal inference. The reader familiar with causality can think of D(θ) as the interventional
distribution over instances Z resulting from a do-intervention that sets the model parameters
to θ in some underlying causal graph. Importantly, this mapping D(·) remains fixed and does
not change over time or by intervention: deploying the same classifier at two different points in
time must induce the same distribution over observations Z. While causal inference focuses
on estimating properties of interventional distributions such as treatment effects [34, 21], our
focus is on a new stability notion and iterative retraining procedures for finding stable points.
Convex optimization. The two solution concepts we introduce generalize the usual notion of
optimality in (empirical) risk minimization to our new framework of performativity. Similarly,
we extend the classical property of gradient descent acting as a contraction under smooth
and strongly convex losses to account for distribution shifts due to performativity. Finally,
we discuss how different regularity assumptions on the loss function affect convergence of
retraining schemes, much like optimization works discuss these assumptions in the context of
convergence of iterative optimization algorithms.
Reinforcement learning. In general, any instance of performative prediction can be reframed
as a reinforcement learning problem. Yet, by studying performative prediction problems within
such a broad framework, we lose many of the intricacies of performativity which make the
problem interesting and tractable to analyze. We return to discuss some of the connections
between both frameworks later on.
2 Framework and main definitions
In this section, we formally introduce the principal solution concepts of our framework: perfor-
mative optimality and performative stability.
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Throughout our presentation, we focus on predictive models that are parametrized by a
vector θ ∈Θ, where the parameter space Θ ⊆Rd is a closed, convex set. We use capital letters
to denote random variables and their lowercase counterparts to denote realizations of these
variables. We consider instances z = (x,y) defined as feature, outcome pairs, where x ∈Rm−1 and
y ∈ R. Whenever we define a variable θ∗ = argminθ g(θ) as the minimizer of a function g, we
resolve the issue of the minimizer not being unique by setting θ∗ to an arbitrary point in the
argminθ g(θ) set.
2.1 Performative optimality
In supervised learning, the goal is to learn a predictor fθ which minimizes the expected loss
with respect to feature, outcome pairs (x,y) drawn i.i.d. from a fixed distributionD. The optimal
classifier fθSL solves the following optimization problem,
θSL = argmin
θ∈Θ
E
Z∼D`(Z;θ),
where `(z;θ) denotes the loss of predictor fθ at a point z.
We contrast this with the performative optimum. As introduced previously, in settings where
predictions support decisions, the manifested distribution over features and outcomes is in
part determined by the deployed classifier. Instead of considering a fixed distribution D, each
classifier fθ induces a potentially different distribution D(θ) over instances z. A predictor must
therefore be evaluated with regard to the expected loss over the distribution D(θ) it induces: its
performative risk.
Definition 2.1 (performative optimality and risk). A classifier fθPO is performatively optimal if
the following relationship holds:
θPO = argmin
θ
E
Z∼D(θ)
`(Z;θ).
We define PR(θ) def= EZ∼D(θ) `(Z;θ) as the performative risk; then, θPO = argminθ PR(θ).
The following example illustrates the differences between the traditional notion of optimality
in supervised learning and performative optima.
Example 2.2 (biased coin flip). Consider the task of predicting the outcome of a biased coin flip
where the bias of the coin depends on a feature X and the assigned score fθ(X).
In particular, define D(θ) in the following way. X is a 1-dimensional feature supported on
{±1} and Y | X ∼ Bernoulli(12 + µX + εθX) with µ ∈ (0, 12 ) and ε < 12 − µ. Assume that the class
of predictors consists of linear models of the form fθ(x) = θx +
1
2 and that the objective is to
minimize the squared loss: `(z;θ) = (y − fθ(x))2.
The parameter ε represents the performative aspect of the model. If ε = 0, outcomes are
independent of the assigned scores and the problem reduces to a standard supervised learning
task where the optimal predictor is the conditional expectation fθSL(x) = E[Y | X = x] = 12 +µx,
with θSL = µ.
In the performative setting with ε , 0, the optimal prediction θPO balances between its
predictive accuracy as well as the bias induced by the prediction itself. In particular, a direct
calculation demonstrates that
θPO = argmin
θ∈[0,1]
E
Z∼D(θ)
(
Y −θX − 1
2
)2
⇐⇒ θPO = µ1− 2ε .
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Hence, the performative optimum and the supervised learning solution are equal if ε = 0 and
diverge as the performativity strength ε increases.
2.2 Performative stability
A natural, desirable property of a classifier fθ is that, given that we use the predictions of fθ as a
basis for decisions, those predictions are also simultaneously optimal for distribution that the
classifier induces. We introduce the notion of performative stability to refer to predictive models
that satisfy this property.
Definition 2.3 (performative stability and decoupled risk). A classifier fθPS is performatively
stable if the following relationship holds:
θPS = argmin
θ
E
Z∼D(θPS)
`(Z;θ).
We define DPR(θ,θ′) def= EZ∼D(θ) `(Z;θ′) as the decoupled performative risk; then, θPS =
argminθDPR(θPS,θ).
A performatively stable classifier fθPS minimizes the expected loss on the distribution D(θPS)
resulting from deploying fθPS in the first place. Therefore, a model that is performatively stable
eliminates the need for retraining after deployment since any retraining procedure would simply
return the same classifier. Performatively stable classifiers are fixed points of risk minimization.
We further develop this idea in the next section.
Observe that performative optimality and performative stability are in general two distinct
solution concepts. Performatively optimal classifiers need not be performatively stable and
performatively stable classifiers need not be performatively optimal. We illustrate this point in
the context of our previous biased coin toss example.
Example 2.2 (continued). Consider again our model of a biased coin toss. In order for a
classifier fθ to be performatively stable, it must satisfy the following relationship:
θPS = argmin
θ∈[0,1]
E
Z∼D(θPS)
(
Y −θX − 1
2
)2
⇐⇒ θPS = µ1− ε .
Solving for θPS directly, we see that there is a unique performatively stable classifier.
Therefore, performative stability and performative optimality need not identify. In fact, in
this example they identify if and only if ε = 0. Note that, in general, if the map D(θ) is constant
across θ, performative optima must coincide with performatively stable solutions. Furthermore,
both coincide with "static" supervised learning solutions as well.
For ease of presentation, we refer to a choice of parameters θ as performatively stable
(optimal) if the classifier parametrized by θ, fθ is performatively stable (optimal). We will
occasionally also refer to performative stability as simply stability.
Remark 2.4. Notice that both performative stability and optimality can be expressed via the decoupled
performative risk as follows:
θPS is performatively stable ⇔ θPS = argmin
θ
DPR(θPS,θ),
θPO is performatively optimal ⇔ θPO = argmin
θ
DPR(θ,θ).
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3 When retraining converges to stable points
Having introduced our framework for performative prediction, we now address some of the
basic questions that arise in this setting and examine the behavior of common machine learning
practices, such as retraining, through the lens of performativity.
As discussed previously, performatively stable classifiers have the favorable property that
they achieve minimal risk for the distribution they induce and hence eliminate the need for
retraining. However, it is a priori not clear that such stable points exist; and even if they do exist,
whether we can find them efficiently. Furthermore, seeing as how performative optimality and
stability are in general distinct solution concepts, under what conditions can we find classifiers
that approximately satisfy both?
In this work, we begin to answer these questions by analyzing two different optimization
strategies. The first is retraining, formally referred to as repeated risk minimization (RRM),
where the exact minimizer is repeatedly computed on the distribution induced by the previous
classifier. The second is repeated gradient descent (RGD), in which the classifier is incrementally
updated using a single gradient descent step on the objective defined by the previous iterate.
We introduce RGD as a computationally efficient approximation of RRM, which, as we show,
adopts many favorable properties of RRM.
Our algorithmic analysis of these methods reveals the existence of stable points under the
assumption that the distribution map D(·) is sufficiently Lipschitz. We identify necessary and
sufficient conditions for convergence to a performatively stable point and establish properties
of the objective under which stable points and performative optima are close.
We begin by analyzing the behavior of these procedures when they operate at a population
level and then extend our analysis to finite samples.
3.1 Assumptions
It is easy to see that one cannot make any guarantees on the convergence of retraining or the
existence of stable points without making some regularity assumptions on D(·). One reasonable
way to quantify the regularity of D(·) is to assume Lipschitz continuity; the Lipschitz constant
determines how sensitive the induced distribution is to a change of classifier. Intuitively, such
an assumption captures the idea that, if decisions are made according to similar predictive
models, then the resulting distributions over instances should also be similar. We now introduce
this key assumption of our work, which we call ε-sensitivity.
Definition 3.1 (ε-sensitivity). We say that a distribution mapD(·) is ε-sensitive if for all θ,θ′ ∈Θ:
W1
(
D(θ),D(θ′)
)
6 ε‖θ −θ′‖2,
where W1 denotes the Wasserstein-1 distance, or earth mover’s distance.
The earth mover’s distance is a natural notion of distance between probability distributions
that provides access to a rich technical repertoire [37, 38]. Furthermore, we can verify that it is
satisfied in various settings.
Remark 3.2. A simple example where this assumption is satisfied is for a Gaussian family. Given
θ = (µ,σ1, . . . ,σp) ∈ R2p, define D(θ) = N (ε1µ,ε22 diag(σ21 , . . . ,σ2p )) where ε1, ε2 ∈ R. Then D(·) is
ε-sensitive for ε = max
{
|ε1|, |ε2|
}
.
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In addition to this assumption on the distribution map, we will often make standard
assumptions on the loss function `(z;θ) which hold for broad classes of losses. To simplify our
presentation, let Z def= ∪θ∈Θsupp(D(θ)).
• (joint smoothness) We say that a loss function `(z;θ) is β-jointly smooth if the gradient
∇θ`(z;θ) is β-Lipschitz in θ and z, that is∥∥∥∇θ`(z;θ)−∇θ`(z;θ′)∥∥∥2 6 β ∥∥∥θ −θ′∥∥∥2 , ∥∥∥∇θ`(z;θ)−∇θ`(z′;θ)∥∥∥2 6 β ∥∥∥z − z′∥∥∥2 , (A1)
for all θ,θ′ ∈Θ and z,z′ ∈ Z.
• (strong convexity) We say that a loss function `(z;θ) is γ-strongly convex if
`(z;θ) > `(z;θ′) +∇θ`(z;θ′)>(θ −θ′) + γ2
∥∥∥θ −θ′∥∥∥2
2
, (A2)
for all θ,θ′ ∈Θ and z ∈ Z. If γ = 0, this assumption is equivalent to convexity.
We will sometimes refer to βγ , where β is as in (A1) and γ as in (A2), as the condition number.
3.2 Repeated risk minimization
We now formally define repeated risk minimization and prove one of our main results: sufficient
and necessary conditions for retraining to converge to a performatively stable point.
Definition 3.3 (RRM). Repeated risk minimization (RRM) refers to the procedure where, starting
from an initial model fθ0 , we perform the following sequence of updates for every t > 0:
θt+1 = G(θt)
def= argmin
θ∈Θ
E
Z∼D(θt)
`(Z;θ).
Using a toy example, we again argue that restrictions on the map D(·) are necessary to
enable interesting analyses of RRM, otherwise it might be computationally infeasible to find
performative optima, and performatively stable points might not even exist.
Example 3.4. Consider optimizing the squared loss `(z;θ) = (y −θ)2, where θ ∈ [0,1] and the
distribution of the outcome Y , according to D(θ), is a point mass at 0 if θ > 12 , and a point mass
at 1 if θ < 12 . Clearly there is no performatively stable point, and RRM will simply result in the
alternating sequence 1,0,1,0, . . . . The performative optimum in this case is θPO =
1
2 .
To show convergence of retraining schemes, it is hence necessary to make a regularity
assumption on D(·), such as ε-sensitivity. We are now ready to state our main result regarding
the convergence of repeated risk minimization.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that the loss `(z;θ) is β-jointly smooth (A1) and γ-strongly convex (A2). If
the distribution map D(·) is ε-sensitive, then the following statements are true:
(a) ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖2 6 ε βγ ‖θ −θ′‖2, for all θ,θ′ ∈Θ.
(b) If ε < γβ , the iterates θt of RRM converge to a unique performatively stable point θPS at a linear
rate: ‖θt −θPS‖2 6 δ for t >
(
1− ε βγ
)−1
log
( ‖θ0−θPS‖2
δ
)
.
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The main message of this theorem is that in performative prediction, if the loss function
is sufficiently "nice" and the distribution map is sufficiently (in)sensitive, then one need only
retrain a classifier a small number of times before it converges to a unique stable point. The
complete proof of Theorem 3.5 can be found in Appendix D.1. Here, we provide the main
intuition through a proof sketch.
Proof Sketch. Fix θ,θ′ ∈Θ. Let f (ϕ) = EZ∼D(θ) `(Z;ϕ) and f ′(ϕ) = EZ∼D(θ′) `(Z;ϕ). By applying
standard properties of strong convexity and the fact that G(θ) is the unique minimizer of f (ϕ),
we can derive that
−γ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖22 > (G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇f (G(θ′)).
Next, we observe that (G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇θ`(z;G(θ′)) is ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖2β-Lipschitz in z. This
follows from applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the fact that the loss is β-jointly
smooth. Using the dual formulation of the earth mover’s distance (Lemma C.3) and ε-sensitivity
ofD(·), as well as the first-order conditions of optimality for convex functions, a short calculation
reveals that
(G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇f (G(θ′)) > −εβ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖2‖θ −θ′‖2.
Claim (a) then follows by combining the previous two inequalities and rearranging. Intuitively,
strong convexity forces the iterates to contract after retraining, yet this contraction is offset
by the distribution shift induced by changing the underlying classifier. Joint smoothness and
ε-sensitivity ensure that this shift is not too large. Part (b) is essentially a consequence of
applying the Banach fixed-point theorem to the result of part (a). 
One intriguing insight from our analysis is that this convergence result is in fact tight;
removing any single assumption required for convergence by Theorem 3.5 is enough to construct
a counterexample for which RRM diverges.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that the distribution map D(·) is ε-sensitive with ε > 0. RRM can fail to
converge at all in any of the following cases, for any choice of parameters β,γ > 0:
(a) The loss is β-jointly smooth and convex, but not strongly convex.
(b) The loss is γ-strongly convex, but not jointly smooth.
(c) The loss is β-jointly smooth and γ-strongly convex, but ε > γβ .
We include a counterexample for statement (a), and defer the proofs of (b) and (c) to
Appendix D.2.
Proof of Proposition 3.6(a): Consider the linear loss defined as ` ((x,y);θ) = βyθ, for θ ∈ [−1,1].
Note that this objective is β-jointly smooth and convex, but not strongly convex. Let the
distribution of Y according to D(θ) be a point mass at εθ, and let the distribution of X be
invariant with respect to θ. Clearly, this distribution is ε-sensitive.
Here, the decoupled performative risk has the following form DPR(θ,ϕ) = εβθϕ. The
unique performatively stable point is 0. However, if we initialize RRM at any point other than
0, the procedure generates the sequence of iterates . . . ,1,−1,1,−1 . . . , thus failing to converge.
Furthermore, this behavior holds for all ε,β > 0. 
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Proposition 3.6 suggests a fundamental difference between strong and weak convexity in
our framing of performative prediction (weak meaning γ = 0). In supervised learning, using
strongly convex losses generally guarantees a faster rate of optimization, yet asymptotically, the
solution achieved with either strongly or weakly convex losses is globally optimal. However, in
our framework, strong convexity is in fact necessary to guarantee convergence of repeated risk
minimization, even for arbitrarily smooth losses and an arbitrarily small sensitivity parameter.
3.3 Repeated gradient descent
Theorem 3.5 demonstrates that repeated risk minimization converges to a unique performatively
stable point if the sensitivity parameter ε is small enough. However, implementing RRM requires
access to an exact optimization oracle. We now relax this requirement and demonstrate how a
simple gradient descent algorithm also converges to a unique stable point.
Definition 3.7 (RGD). Repeated gradient descent (RGD) is the procedure where, starting from an
initial model fθ0 , we perform the following sequence of updates for every t > 0:
θt+1 = Ggd(θt)
def= ΠΘ
(
θt − η E
Z∼D(θt)
∇θ`(Z;θt)
)
,
where η > 0 is a fixed step size and ΠΘ denotes the Euclidean projection operator onto Θ.
Note that repeated gradient descent only requires the loss ` to be differentiable with respect
to θ. It does not require taking gradients of the performative risk. Like RRM, we can show that
RGD is a contractive mapping for small enough sensitivity parameter ε.
Theorem 3.8. Suppose that the loss `(z;θ) is β-jointly smooth (A1) and γ-strongly convex (A2).
If the distribution map D(·) is ε-sensitive with ε < γ(β+γ)(1+1.5ηβ) , then RGD with step size η 6 2β+γ
satisfies the following:
(a) ‖Ggd(θ)−Ggd(θ′)‖2 6
(
1− η
(
βγ
β+γ − ε(1.5ηβ2 + β)
))
‖θ −θ′‖2 < ‖θ −θ′‖2.
(b) The iterates θt of RGD converge to a unique performatively stable point θPS at a linear rate,
‖θt −θPS‖2 6 δ for t > 1η
(
βγ
β+γ − ε(1.5ηβ2 + β)
)−1
log
( ‖θ0−θPS‖2
δ
)
.
The conclusion of Theorem 3.8 is a strict generalization of a classical optimization result
which considers a static objective, in which case the rate of contraction is
(
1− η βγβ+γ
)
(see for
example Theorem 2.1.15 in [33] or Lemma 3.7 in [16]). Our rate exactly matches this classical
result in the case that ε = 0. The proof of Theorem 3.8 can be found in Appendix D.3.
3.4 Finite-sample analysis
We now extend our main results regarding the convergence of RRM and RGD to the finite-
sample regime. To do so, we leverage the fact that, under mild regularity conditions, the
empirical distribution Dn given by n samples drawn i.i.d. from a true distribution D is with
high probability close to D in earth mover’s distance [13].
We begin by defining the finite-sample version of these procedures.
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Definition 3.9 (RERM & REGD). Define repeated empirical risk minimization (RERM) to be the
procedure where starting from a classifier fθ0 at every iteration t > 0, we collect nt samples fromD(θt) and perform the update:
θt+1 = G
nt (θt)
def= argmin
θ
E
Z∼Dnt (θt)
`(Z;θ).
Similarly, define repeated empirical gradient descent (REGD) to be the optimization procedure
with update rule:
θt+1 = G
nt
gd(θt)
def= ΠΘ
(
θt − η E
Z∼Dnt (θt)
∇θ`(Z;θt)
)
.
Here, η > 0 is a step size and ΠΘ denotes the Euclidean projection operator onto Θ.
The following theorem illustrates that with enough samples collected at every iteration,
with high probability both algorithms converge to a small neighborhood around a stable point.
Recall that m is the dimension of data samples z.
Theorem 3.10. Suppose that the loss `(z;θ) is β-jointly smooth (A1) and γ-strongly convex (A2),
and that there exist α > 1,µ > 0 such that ξα,µ
def=
∫
Rm
eµ|x|αdD(θ) is finite ∀θ ∈Θ. Let δ ∈ (0,1) be a
radius of convergence. Consider running RERM or RGD with nt =O
(
1
(εδ)m log
(
t
p
))
samples at time t.
(a) If D(·) is ε-sensitive with ε < γ2β , then with probability 1− p, RERM satisfies,
‖θt −θPS‖2 6 δ, for all t >
log
(
1
δ ‖θ0 −θPS‖2
)(
1− 2εβγ
) .
(b) If D(·) is ε-sensitive with ε < γ(β+γ)(1+1.5ηβ) , then with probability 1− p, REGD with satisfies,
‖θt −θPS‖2 6 δ, for all t >
log
(
1
δ ‖θ0 −θPS‖2
)
η
(
βγ
β+γ − ε(3ηβ2 + 2β)
) ,
for a constant choice of step size η 6 2β+γ .
Proof sketch. The basic idea behind these results is the following. While ‖θt − θPS‖2 > δ, the
sample size nt is sufficiently large to ensure a behavior similar to that on a population level: as
in Theorems 3.5 and 3.8, the iterates θt contract toward θPS. This implies that θt eventually
enters a δ-ball around θPS, for some large enough t. Once this happens, contrary to population-
level results, a contraction is no longer guaranteed due to the noise inherent in observing only
finite-sample approximations of D(θt). Nevertheless, the sample size nt is sufficiently large to
ensure that θt cannot escape a δ-ball around θPS either. 
4 Relating performative optimality and stability
As we discussed previously, while performative optima are always guaranteed to exist,1 it is
not clear whether performatively stable classifiers exist in all settings. Our algorithmic analysis
1In particular, they are guaranteed to exist over the extended real line, i.e. we allow θ ∈ (R∪ {±∞})d .
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of repeated risk minimization and repeated gradient descent revealed the existence of unique
stable points under the assumption that the objective is strongly convex and smooth. The first
result of this section illustrates existence of stable points under weaker assumptions on the loss,
in the case where the solution space Θ is constrained. All proofs can be found in Appendix D.
Proposition 4.1. Let the distribution map D(·) be ε-sensitive and Θ ⊂ Rd be compact. If the loss
`(z;θ) is convex and jointly continuous in (z,θ), then there exists a performatively stable classifier.
A natural question to consider at this point is whether there are procedures analogous to
RRM and RGD for efficiently computing performative optima.
Our analysis suggests that directly minimizing the performative risk is in general a more
challenging problem than finding performatively stable points. In particular, we can construct
simple examples where the performative risk PR(θ) is non-convex, despite strong regularity
assumptions on the loss and the distribution map.
Proposition 4.2. The performative risk PR(θ) can be concave in θ, even if the loss `(z;θ) is β-jointly
smooth (A1), γ-strongly convex (A2), and the distribution map D(·) is ε-sensitive with ε < γβ .
However, what we can show is that there are cases where finding performatively stable points
is sufficient to guarantee that the resulting classifier has low performative risk. In particular, our
next result demonstrates that if the loss function `(z;θ) is Lipschitz in z and γ-strongly convex,
then all performatively stable points and performative optima lie in a small neighborhood
around each other. Moreover, the theorem holds for cases where performative optima and
performatively stable points are not necessarily unique.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose that the loss `(z;θ) is Lz-Lipschitz in z, γ-strongly convex (A2), and that
the distribution map D(·) is ε-sensitive. Then, for every performatively stable point θPS and every
performative optimum θPO:
‖θPO −θPS‖2 6 2Lzεγ .
This result shows that in cases where repeated risk minimization converges to a stable point,
the resulting classifier approximately minimizes the performative risk.
Moreover, Theorem 4.3 suggests a way of converging close to performative optima in objective
value even if the loss function is smooth and convex, but not strongly convex. In particular, by
adding quadratic regularization to the objective, we can ensure that RRM or RGD converge to a
stable point that approximately minimizes the performative risk, see Appendix E.
5 A case study in strategic classification
Having presented our model for performative prediction, we now proceed to illustrate how
these ideas can be applied within the context of strategic classification and discuss some of the
implications of our theorems for this setting.
We begin by formally establishing how strategic classification can be cast as a performative
prediction problem and illustrate how our framework can be used to derive results regarding
the convergence of popular retraining heuristics in strategic classification settings. Afterwards,
we further develop the connections between both fields by empirically evaluating the behavior
of repeated risk minimization on a dynamic credit scoring task.
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Input: base distribution D, classifier fθ, cost function c, and utility function u
Sampling procedure for D(θ):
1. Sample (x,y) ∼ D
2. Compute best response xBR← argmaxx′ u(x′ ,θ)− c(x′ ,x)
3. Output sample (xBR, y)
Figure 1: Distribution map for strategic classification.
5.1 Stackelberg equilibria are performative optima
Strategic classification is a two-player game between an institution which deploys a classifier
and agents who selectively adapt their features in order to improve their outcomes.
A classic example of this setting is that of a bank which uses a machine learning classifier to
predict whether or not a loan applicant is creditworthy. Individual applicants react to the bank’s
classifier by manipulating their features with the hopes of inducing a favorable classification.
This game is said to have a Stackelberg structure since agents adapt their features only after the
bank has deployed their classifier.
The optimal strategy for the institution in a strategic classification setting is to deploy the
solution corresponding to the Stackelberg equilibrium, defined as the classifier fθ which achieves
minimal loss over the induced distribution D(θ) in which agents have strategically adapted
their features in response to fθ. In fact, we see that this equilibrium notion exactly matches our
definition of performative optimality:
fθSE is a Stackelberg equilibrium ⇐⇒ θSE ∈ argmin
θ
PR(θ).
We think of D as a "baseline" distribution over feature-outcome pairs before any classifier
deployment, and D(θ) denotes the distribution over features and outcomes obtained by strategi-
cally manipulating D. As described in existing work [15, 32, 8], the distribution function D(θ)
in strategic classification corresponds to the data-generating process outlined in Figure 1.
Here, u and c are problem-specific functions which determine the best response for agents
in the game. Together with the base distribution D, these define the relevant distribution map
D(·) for the problem of strategic classification.
A strategy that is commonly adapted in practice as a means of coping with the distribution
shift that arises in strategic classification is to repeatedly retrain classifiers on the induced dis-
tributions. This procedure corresponds to the repeated risk minimization procedure introduced
in Definition 3.3. Our results describe the first set of sufficient conditions under which repeated
retraining overcomes strategic effects.
Corollary 5.1. Let the institution’s loss `(z;θ) be Lz- and Lθ-Lipschitz in z and θ respectively, β-
jointly smooth (A1), and γ-strongly convex (A2). If the induced distribution map is ε-sensitive,
with ε < γβ , then RRM converges at a linear rate to a performatively stable classifier θPS that is
2Lzε(Lθ +Lzε)γ−1 close in objective value to the Stackelberg equilibrium.
5.2 Simulations
We next examine the convergence of repeated risk minimization and repeated gradient descent
in a simulated strategic classification setting. We run experiments on a dynamic credit scoring
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Figure 2: Convergence in domain of RRM (left) and RGD (right) for varying ε-sensitivity parameters. We
add a marker if at the next iteration the distance between iterates is numerically zero. We normalize the
distance by c = ‖θ0,S‖−12 .
simulator in which an institution classifies the creditworthiness of loan applicants. As motivated
previously, agents react to the institution’s classifier by manipulating their features to increase
the likelihood that they receive a favorable classification.
To run our simulations, we construct a distribution map D(θ), as described in Figure 1.
For the base distribution D, we use a class-balanced subset of a Kaggle credit scoring dataset
[22]. Features x ∈Rm−1 correspond to historical information about an individual, such as their
monthly income and number of credit lines. Outcomes y ∈ {0,1} are binary variables which are
equal to 1 if the individual defaulted on a loan and 0 otherwise.
The institution makes predictions using a logistic regression classifier. We assume that
individuals have linear utilities u(θ,x) = −〈θ,x〉 and quadratic costs c(x′ ,x) = 12ε‖x′ − x‖22, where
ε is a positive constant that regulates the cost incurred by changing features. Linear utilities
indicate that agents wish to minimize their assigned probability of default.
We divide the set of features into strategic features S ⊆ [m− 1], such as the number of open
credit lines, and non-strategic features (e.g., age). Solving the optimization problem described
in Figure 1, the best response for an individual corresponds to the following update,
x′S = xS − εθS ,
where xS ,x′S ,θS ∈R|S |. As per convention in the literature [8, 15, 32], individual outcomes y are
unaffected by strategic manipulation.
Intuitively, this data-generating process is ε-sensitive since for a given choice of classifiers,
fθ and fθ′ , an individual feature vector is shifted to xS − εθS and to xS − εθ′S , respectively. The
distance between these two shifted points is equal to ε‖θS −θ′S‖2. Since the optimal transport
distance is bounded by ε‖θ −θ′‖2 for every individual point, it is also bounded by this quantity
over the entire distribution. A full proof of this claim is presented in Appendix B.2.
For our experiments, instead of sampling from D(θ), we treat the points in the original
dataset as the true distribution. Hence, we can think of all the following procedures as operating
at the population level. Furthermore, we add a regularization term to the logistic loss to ensure
that the objective is strongly convex.
Repeated risk minimization. The first experiment we consider is the convergence of RRM.
From our theoretical analysis, we know that RRM is guaranteed to converge at a linear rate to a
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Figure 3: Performative risk (left) and accuracy (right) of the classifier θt at different stages of RRM for
ε = 80. Blue lines indicates the optimization phase and green lines indicate the effect of the distribution
shift after the classifier deployment.
performatively stable point if the sensitivity parameter ε is smaller than γβ . In Figure 2 (left),
we see that RRM does indeed converge in only a few iterations for small values of ε while it
divergences if ε is too large.
The evolution of the performative risk during the RRM optimization is illustrated in Figure 3.
We evaluate PR(θ) at the beginning and at the end of each optimization round and indicate the
effect due to distribution shift with a dashed green line. We also verify that the surrogate loss is
a good proxy for classification accuracy in the performative setting.
Repeated gradient descent. In the case of RGD, we find similar behavior to that of RRM.
While the iterates again converge linearly, they naturally do so at a slower rate than in the exact
minimization setting, given that each iteration consists only of a single gradient step. Again, we
can see in Figure 2 that the iterates converge for small values of ε and diverge for large values.
6 Discussion and Future Work
Our work draws attention to the fundamental problem of performativity in statistical learning
and decision-making. Performative prediction enjoys a clean formal setup that we introduced,
drawing on elements from causality and game theory.
Retraining is often considered a nuisance intended to cope with distribution shift. In contrast,
our work interprets retraining as the natural equilibrating dynamic for performative prediction.
The fixed points of retraining are performative stable points. Moreover, retraining converges to
such stable points under natural assumptions, including strong convexity of the loss function.
It is interesting to note that (weak) convexity alone is not enough. Performativity thus gives
another intriguing perspective on why strong convexity is desirable in supervised learning.
Several interesting questions remain. For example, by letting the step size of repeated
gradient descent tend to 0, we see that this procedure converges for ε < γβ+γ . Exact repeated
risk minimization, on the other hand, provably converges for every ε < γβ , and we showed this
inequality is tight. It would be interesting to understand whether this gap is a fundamental
difference between both procedures or an artifact of our analysis.
Lastly, we believe that the tools and ideas from performative prediction can be used to make
progress in other subareas of machine learning. For example, in this paper, we have illustrated
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how reframing strategic classification as a performative prediction problem leads to a new
understanding of when retraining overcomes strategic effects. However, we view this example
as only scratching the surface of work connecting performative prediction with other fields.
In particular, reinforcement learning can be thought of as a case of performative prediction.
In this setting, the choice of policy fθ, affects the distribution D(θ) over z = {(sh, ah)}∞h=1, the set
of visited states, s, and actions, a, in a Markov Decision Process. Building off this connection, we
can reinterpret repeated risk minimization as a form of off-policy learning in which an agent
first collects a batch of data under a particular policy fθ, and then finds the optimal policy for
that trajectory offline. We believe that some of the ideas developed in the context of performative
prediction can shed new light on when these off-policy methods can converge.
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A Applications of performativity
To illustrate the fact that performativity is a common cause for concept drift, we review a table of
concepts drift applications from [41]. In Table 1, we highlight those settings that naturally occur
due to performativity. Below we briefly discuss the role of performativity in such applications.
Indust.
Appl.
Monitoring & control Information management Analytics & diagnostics
Security,
Police
fraud detection,
insider trading detection,
adversary actions detection
next crime place
prediction
crime volume
prediction
Finance,
Banking,
Telecom,
Insurance,
Marketing,
Retail,
Advertising
monitoring & management
of customer segments,
bankruptcy prediction
product or service
recommendation,
including complimentary,
user intent or information
need prediction
demand prediction,
response rate
prediction, budget
planning
Production
industry controlling output quality - predict bottlenecks
Education
(e-Learning,
e-Health),
Media,
Entertainment
gaming the system,
drop out prediction
music, VOD, movie,
news, learning object
personalized search
& recommendations
player-centered game
design, learner-centered
education
Table 1: Table of concept drift applications from Žliobaite˙ et al. [41]
The role of fraud detection systems is to predict whether an instance such as a transaction or
email is legitimate or not. It is well-known that designers of such fraudulent instances adapt to
the fraud detection system in place in order to breach security [6]. Therefore, the deployment of
fraud detection systems shapes the features of fraudulent instances.
Crime place prediction, sometimes referred to as predictive policing [12, 26, 29], uses his-
torical data to estimate the likelihood of crime at a given location. Those locations where
criminal behavior is deemed likely by the system typically get more police patrols and better
surveillance which act on the one hand to deter crime. These actions resulting from prediction
significantly decrease the probability of crime taking place, thus changing the data used for
future predictions.
In personalized recommendations, instances are recommended to a user based on their histori-
cal context, such as their ratings or purchases. The set of recommendations thus depends on the
trained machine learning model, which in turn changes the user’s future ratings or purchases
[7]. In other words, user features serving as input to a recommender inevitably depend on the
previously used recommendation mechanisms.
In online two-player games, it is common to request an AI opponent. The level of sophistica-
tion of the AI opponent might be chosen depending on the user’s success history in the given
game, with the goal of making the game appropriately challenging. This choice of AI opponent
changes players’ future success profiles, again causing a distribution shift in the features serving
as an input to the prediction system.
Gaming the system falls under the umbrella of strategic classification, which we discuss in
detail in Section 5, so we avoid further discussion in this section.
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B Experiments
B.1 Visualizing the performative risk and trajectory of RRM
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Figure 4: Performative risk surface and trajectory of repeated risk minimization for two different values
of sensitivity parameter ε. The initial iterate is the risk minimizer on the base dataset (•). We mark the
performative optimum (?) and performatively stable point (×).
We provide additional experimental results in which we visualize the trajectory of repeated
risk minimization on the surface of the performative risk. We adopt the general setting of
Section 5. However, to properly visualize the loss, we rerun the experiments on a reduced
version of the dataset with only two features (i.e x ∈R2), both of which are adapted strategically
according to the update described in Section 5.
Figure 4 plots the performative risk surface, together with the trajectory of RRM given by
straight black lines. The top plot shows the trajectory for a suitably small sensitivity parameter
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ε. We see that RRM converges to a stable point which is close to the performative optimum. We
contrast this behavior with that of RRM when ε is large in the bottom plot. Here, we observe
that the iterates oscillate and that the algorithm fails to converge. Both plots mark the risk
minimizer on the initial data set (•), before any strategic adaptation takes place. This point also
corresponds to the initial iterate of RRM θ0. We additionally mark the performative optimum
(?) on the risk curve. The top plot additionally marks the last iterate of RRM, which serves as a
proxy for the performatively stable point (×). As predicted by our theory, this stable point is in
a small neighborhood around the performative optimum.
B.2 Experimental details
Base distribution. The base distribution consists of the Kaggle data set [22]. We subsample
n = 18,357 points from the original training set such that both classes are approximately
balanced (45% of points have y equal to 1). There are a total of 10 features, 3 of which we treat
as strategic features: utilization of credit lines, number of open credit lines, and number of real
estate loans. We scale features in the base distribution so that they have zero mean and unit
variance.
Verifying ε-sensitivity. We verify that the map D(·), as described in Section 5, is ε-sensitive.
To do so, we analyze W1(D(θ),D(θ′)), for arbitrary θ,θ′ ∈Θ. Fix a sample point x ∈Rm−1 from
the base dataset. Because the base distribution D is supported on n points, we can upper
bound the optimal transport distance between any pair of distributions D(θ) and D(θ′) by the
Euclidean distance between the shifted versions of x in D(θ) and D(θ′).
In our construction, the point x is shifted to x−εθ and to x−εθ′ inD(θ) andD(θ′) respectively.
The distance between these two shifted points is ‖x − εθ − x + εθ′‖2 = ε‖θ −θ′‖2. Since the same
relationship holds for all other samples x in the base dataset, the optimal transport from D(θ)
to D(θ′) is at most ε‖θ −θ′‖2.
Verifying joint smoothness of the objective. For the experiments described in Figure 2, we
run repeated risk minimization and repeated gradient descent on the logistic loss with `2
regularization:
1
n
n∑
i=1
−yiθ>xi + log
(
1 + exp(θ>xi)
)
+
γ
2
‖θ‖22 (1)
For both the repeated risk minimization and repeated gradient descent we set γ = 1000/n,
where n is the size of the base dataset.
For a particular feature-outcome pair (xi , yi), the logistic loss is
1
4‖xi‖22 smooth [35]. Therefore,
the entire objective is 14n
∑n
i=1‖xi‖22 +γ smooth. Due to the strategic updates, xBR = x − εθ, the
norm of individual features change depending on the choice of model parameters.
Theoretically, we can upper bound the smoothness of the objective by finding the implicit
constraints on Θ, which can be revealed by looking at the dual of the objective function for
every fixed value of ε. However, for simplicity, we simply calculate the worst-case smoothness
of the objective, given the trajectory of iterates {θt}, for every fixed ε.
Furthermore, we can verify the logistic loss is jointly smooth. For a fixed example z = (x,y),
the gradient of the regularized logistic loss with respect to θ is,
22
∇θ`(z;θ) = yx+ exp(θ
>x)
1 + exp(θ>x)x+γθ,
which is 2-Lipschitz in z due to y ∈ {0,1}. Hence, the overall objective is β-jointly smooth with
parameter
β = max
{
2,
1
4n
n∑
i=1
‖xi‖22 +γ
}
.
For RRM, ε is less than γβ only in the case that ε = 0.01. For RGD, ε is never smaller than the
theoretical cutoff of γ(β+γ)(1+1.5ηβ) .
Optimization details. The definition of RRM requires exact minimization of the objective at
every iteration. We approximate this requirement by minimizing the objective described in
expression (1) to small tolerance, 10−8, using gradient descent. We choose the step size at every
iteration using backtracking line search.
In the case of repeated gradient descent, we run the procedure as described in Definition 3.7
with a fixed step size of η = 2β+γ .
C Auxiliary lemmas
Lemma C.1 (First-order optimality condition). Let f be convex and let Ω be a closed convex set on
which f is differentiable, then
x∗ ∈ argmin
x∈Ω
f (x)
if and only if
∇f (x∗)T (y − x∗) > 0, ∀y ∈Ω.
Lemma C.2 (Bubeck, 2015 [9], Lemma 3.11). Let f :Rd →R be β-smooth and γ-strongly convex,
then for all x,y in Rd ,
(∇f (x)−∇f (y))>(x − y) > γβ
γ + β
‖x − y‖22 +
1
γ + β
‖∇f (x)−∇f (y)‖22.
Lemma C.3 (Kantorovich-Rubinstein). A distribution map D(·) is ε-sensitive if and only if for all
θ,θ′ ∈Θ:
sup
{∣∣∣∣ E
Z∼D(θ)
g(Z)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
g(Z)
∣∣∣∣ 6 ε‖θ −θ′‖2 : g :Rp→R, g 1-Lipschitz} .
Lemma C.4. Let f : Rn→ Rd be an L-Lipschitz function, and let X,X ′ ∈ Rn be random variables
such that W1(X,X ′) 6 C. Then
‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖2 6 LC.
Proof.
‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖22 = (E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)])>(E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)])
= ‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖2 (E[f (X)]−E[f (X
′)])>
‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖2 (E[f (X)]−E[f (X
′)]).
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Now define the unit vector v := E[f (X)]−E[f (X
′)]
‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖2 . By linearity of expectation, we can further
write
‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖22 = ‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖2 (E[v>f (X)]−E[v>f (X ′)]).
For any unit vector v and L-Lipschitz function f , v>f is a one-dimensional L-Lipschitz function,
so we can apply Lemma C.3 to obtain
‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖22 6 ‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖2LC.
Canceling out ‖E[f (X)]−E[f (X ′)]‖2 from both sides concludes the proof. 
D Proofs of main results
D.1 Proof of Theorem 3.5
Fix θ,θ′ ∈ Θ. Let f (ϕ) = EZ∼D(θ) `(Z;ϕ) and f ′(ϕ) = EZ∼D(θ′) `(Z;ϕ). Since f is γ-strongly
convex and G(θ) is the unique minimizer of f (x) we know that,
f (G(θ))− f (G(θ′)) > (G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇f (G(θ′)) + γ
2
‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖22 (2)
f (G(θ′))− f (G(θ)) > γ
2
‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖22 (3)
Together, these two inequalities imply that
−γ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖22 > (G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇f (G(θ′)).
Next, we observe that (G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇θ`(z;G(θ′)) is ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖2β-Lipschitz in z. This
follows from applying Cauchy-Schwarz and the fact that the loss is β-jointly smooth. Using the
dual formulation of the optimal transport distance (Lemma C.3) and ε-sensitivity of D(·),
(G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇f (G(θ′))− (G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇f ′(G(θ′)) > −εβ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖2‖θ −θ′‖2.
Furthermore, using the first-order optimality conditions for convex functions, we have (G(θ)−
G(θ′))>∇f ′(G(θ′)) > 0, and hence (G(θ)−G(θ′))>∇f (G(θ′)) > −εβ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖2‖θ−θ′‖2. There-
fore, we conclude that,
−γ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖22 > −εβ‖G(θ)−G(θ′)‖2‖θ −θ′‖2.
Claim (a) then follows by rearranging.
To prove claim (b) we note that θt = G(θt−1) by the definition of RRM, and G(θPS) = θPS by
the definition of stability. Applying the result of part (a) yields
‖θt −θPS‖2 6 ε βγ ‖θt−1 −θPS‖2 6
(
ε
β
γ
)t
‖θ0 −θPS‖2. (4)
Setting this expression to be at most δ and solving for t completes the proof of claim (b).
D.2 Proof of Proposition 3.6
As for statement (a), we provide one counterexample for each of the statements (b) and (c).
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Proof of (b): Consider a type of regularized hinge loss `(z;θ) = Cmax(−1, yθ) + γ2 (θ − 1)2, and
suppose Θ ⊇ [− 12ε , 12ε ].
Let the distribution of Y according to D(θ) be a point mass at εθ, and let the distribution of
X be invariant with respect to θ. Clearly, this distribution is ε-sensitive.
Let θ0 = 2. Then, by picking C big enough, RRM prioritizes to minimize the first term
exactly, and hence we get θ1 = − 12ε . In the next step, again due to large C, we get θ2 = 2. Thus,
RRM keeps oscillating between 2 and − 12ε , failing to converge. This argument holds for all
γ,ε > 0.
Proof of (c): Suppose that the loss function is the squared loss, `(z;θ) = (y−θ)2, where y,θ ∈R.
Note that this implies β = γ . Let the distribution of Y according to D(θ) be a point mass at
1 + εθ, and let the distribution of X be invariant with respect to θ. This distribution family
satisfies ε-sensitivity, because
W1(D(θ),D(θ′)) = ε|θ −θ′ |.
By properties of the squared loss, we know
argmin
θ′
DPR(θ,θ′) = E
Z∼D(θ)
[Y ] = 1 + εθ.
It is thus not hard to see that RRM does not contract if ε > γβ = 1:
|G(θ)−G(θ′)| = ∣∣∣1 + εθ − 1− εθ′∣∣∣ = ε|θ −θ′ |,
which exactly matches the bound of Theorem 3.5 and proves the first statement of the proposi-
tion. The unique performatively stable point of this problem is θ such that θ = 1 + εθ, which is
θPS =
1
1−ε for ε > 1.
For ε = 1, no performatively stable point exists, thereby proving the second claim of the
proposition. If ε > 1 on the other hand, and θ0 , θPS, we either have θt → ∞ or θt → −∞,
because
θt = 1 + εθt−1 =
t−1∑
k=0
εk +θ0ε
t =
εt − 1
ε − 1 +θ0ε
t ,
thus concluding the proof.
D.3 Proof of Theorem 3.8
Since projecting onto a convex set can only bring two iterates closer together, in this proof we
ignore the projection operator ΠΘ and treat Ggd as performing merely the gradient step.
We begin by expanding out ‖Ggd(θ)−Ggd(θ′)‖22,
‖Ggd(θ)−Ggd(θ′)‖22 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥θ − η EZ∼D(θ)∇θ`(Z;θ)−θ′ + η EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
= ‖θ −θ′‖22 − 2η(θ −θ′)>
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
+ η2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
def= T1 − 2ηT2 + η2T3.
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Next, we analyze each term individually,
T1
def= ‖θ −θ′‖22,
T2
def= (θ −θ′)>
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
,
T3
def= ‖ E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)‖22.
We start by lower bounding T2:
T2 = (θ −θ′)>
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ) + E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
= (θ −θ′)>
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)
)
+ (θ −θ′)>
(
E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
> −‖θ −θ′‖2 ‖ E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)‖2 + (θ −θ′)>
(
E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
,
where in the last step we apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. By smoothness, ∇θ`(Z;θ) is
β-Lipschitz in Z. Together with the fact that Z is ε-sensitive, we can lower bound the first term
in the above expression by applying Lemma C.4, which results in −βε‖θ −θ′‖22.
We apply Lemma C.2 to lower bound the second term by
(θ −θ′)>
(
E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
>
βγ
β +γ
‖θ −θ′‖22 +
1
β +γ
E
Z∼D(θ′)
[
‖∇θ`(Z;θ)−∇θ`(Z;θ′)‖22
]
>
βγ
β +γ
‖θ −θ′‖22 +
1
β +γ
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ′)[∇θ`(Z;θ)−∇θ`(Z;θ′)]
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
,
where we have applied Jensen’s inequality in the last line. Putting everything together, we get
T2 >
(
βγ
β +γ
− βε
)
‖θ −θ′‖22 +
1
β +γ
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ′)[∇θ`(Z;θ)−∇θ`(Z;θ′)]
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
.
Now we upper bound T3. We begin by expanding out the square just as before,
T3 =
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ) + EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
=
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
+ 2
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)
)> (
E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
.
(5)
We again bound each term individually. By the smoothness of the loss and Lemma C.4,∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
6 β2ε2‖θ −θ′‖22.
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Moving on to the last term in (5):
2
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)
)> (
E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
def= 2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)
)>
v
= 2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
v>∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
v>∇θ`(Z;θ)
)
,
where we define the unit vector v def=
EZ∼D(θ′ )∇θ`(Z;θ)−EZ∼D(θ′ )∇θ`(Z;θ′)
‖EZ∼D(θ′ )∇θ`(Z;θ)−EZ∼D(θ′ )∇θ`(Z;θ′)‖2 . By smoothness of the loss,
we can conclude that v>∇θ`(Z,θ) is β-Lipschitz, so by ε-sensitivity we get
2
(
E
Z∼D(θ)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)
)> (
E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ)− E
Z∼D(θ′)
∇θ`(Z;θ′)
)
6 2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
βε‖θ −θ′‖2
6 2β2ε‖θ −θ′‖22,
where in the last step we again apply smoothness. Hence,
T3 6 (ε
2β2 + 2β2ε)
∥∥∥θ −θ′∥∥∥2
2
+
∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
.
Having bounded all the terms, we now conclude that∥∥∥Ggd(θ)−Ggd(θ′)∥∥∥22 6 (1 + η2ε2β2 + 2η2β2ε − 2η βγβ +γ + 2ηβε
)
‖θ −θ′‖22
−
(
2η
β +γ
− η2
)∥∥∥∥∥∥ EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ)− EZ∼D(θ′)∇θ`(Z;θ′)
∥∥∥∥∥∥2
2
.
If we take the step size η to be small enough, namely η 6 2β+γ , we get∥∥∥Ggd(θ)−Ggd(θ′)∥∥∥22 6 (1 + η2ε2β2 + 2η2β2ε − 2η βγβ +γ + 2ηβε
)
‖θ −θ′‖22.
To ensure a contraction, we need 2η βγβ+γ − η2ε2β2 − 2η2β2ε − 2ηβε > 0. Canceling out ηβ, and
assuming ε 6 1, it suffices to have 2γβ+γ − 3ηεβ − 2ε > 0. Therefore, if ε < γ(β+γ)(1+1.5ηβ) 6 1, the
map Ggd is contractive. In particular, we have
∥∥∥Ggd(θ)−Ggd(θ′)∥∥∥2 6
√(
1− η
(
2
βγ
β +γ
− ε(3ηβ2 + 2β)
))
‖θ −θ′‖2
6
(
1− η
(
βγ
β +γ
− ε(1.5ηβ2 + β)
))
‖θ −θ′‖2,
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where we use the fact that
√
1− x 6 1− x2 for x ∈ [0,1]. This completes the proof of part (a).
Since we have shown Ggd is contractive, by the Banach fixed-point theorem we know that
there exists a unique fixed point ofGgd. That is, there exists θPS such thatEZ∼D(θPS)∇θ`(Z;θPS) =
0. By convexity of the loss function, this means that θPS is the optimum of EZ∼D(θPS) `(Z;θ) over
θ, which in turn implies that θPS is performatively stable. Recursively applying the result of
part (a) we get the rate of convergence of RRM to θPS:
‖θt −θPS‖2 6
(
1− η
(
βγ
β +γ
− ε(1.5ηβ2 + β)
))t
‖θ0 −θPS‖2
6 exp
(
−tη
(
βγ
β +γ
− ε(1.5ηβ2 + β)
))
‖θ0 −θPS‖2,
where in the last step we use the fact that 1− x 6 e−x. Setting this expression to be at most δ and
solving for t completes the proof.
D.4 Proof of Theorem 3.10
Proof of (a): We introduce the main proof idea and then present the full argument. The proof
proceeds by case analysis. First, we show that if ‖θt −θPS‖2 > δ, performing ERM ensures that
with high probability ‖θt+1 − θPS‖2 6 2ε βγ ‖θt − θPS‖2. Using our assumption that ε < γ2β , this
implies that the iterate θt+1 contracts toward θPS.
On the other hand, if ‖θt −θPS‖2 6 δ, we show that while ERM might not contract, it cannot
push θt+1 too far from θPS either. In particular, θt+1 must be in a
εβ
2γ δ-ball around θPS. The proof
then concludes by arguing that θt for t >
log(‖θ0−θPS‖2/δ)
log(γ/2εβ) must enter a ball of radius δ around θPS.
Once this event occurs, no future iterate can exit the εβ2γ δ-ball around θPS.
Case 1: ‖θt − θPS‖2 > δ. If the current iterate is outside the ball, we show that with high
probability the next iterate contracts towards a performatively stable point. In particular,
‖θt+1 −θPS‖2 6 2εβγ ‖θt −θPS‖2.
To prove this claim, we begin by showing that
W1(Dnt (θt),D(θPS)) 6 2ε‖θt −θPS‖2, with probability 1− 6ppi2t2 . (6)
Since the W1-distance is a metric on the space of distributions, we can apply the triangle
inequality to get
W1(Dnt (θt),D(θPS)) 6W1(Dnt (θt),D(θt)) +W1(D(θt),D(θPS)).
The second term is bounded deterministically by ε‖θt −θPS‖2 due to ε-sensitivity. By Theorem
2 of Fournier & Guillin, 2015 [13], for nt >
1
c2(εδ)m
log
(
t2pi2c1
6p
)
, the probability that the first term
is greater than εδ is less that 6pt2pi2 . Here, the positive constants c1, c2 depend on α,µ,ξα,µ and m.
Therefore,
W1(Dnt (θt),D(θPS)) 6 εδ+ ε‖θt −θPS‖2 6 2ε‖θt −θPS‖2, with probability 1− 6ppi2t2 .
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Using this, we can now prove that the iterates contract. Following the first steps of the proof of
Theorem 3.5, we have that
(Gnt (θt)−G(θPS))>
(
E
Z∼Dnt (θt)
∇θ`(Z;Gnt (θt))− E
Z∼D(θPS)
∇θ`(Z;Gnt (θt))
)
+(Gnt (θt)−G(θPS))>
(
E
Z∼D(θPS)
∇θ`(Z;Gnt (θt))− E
Z∼D(θPS)
∇θ`(Z;G(θPS))
)
6 0.
(7)
Like in the proof of Theorem 3.5, the term (Gnt (θt) − G(θPS))>EZ∼Dnt (θt)∇θ`(Z;Gnt (θt)) is
‖Gnt (θt) − G(θPS)‖2 · β Lipschitz in Z. Using equation (6), with probability 1 − 6ppi2t2 we can
bound the first term by
(Gnt (θt)−G(θPS))>
(
E
Z∼Dnt (θt)
∇θ`(Z;Gnt (θt))− E
Z∼D(θPS)
∇θ`(Z;Gnt (θt))
)
> − 2εβ ‖Gnt (θt)−G(θPS)‖2 ‖θt −θPS‖2.
And by strong convexity,
(Gnt (θt)−G(θPS))>
(
E
Z∼D(θPS)
∇θ`(Z;Gnt (θt))− E
Z∼D(θPS)
∇θ`(Z;G(θPS))
)
> γ‖Gnt (θt)−G(θPS)‖22.
Plugging back into equation (7), we conclude that with high probability
‖θt+1 −θPS‖2 6 2εβγ ‖θt −θPS‖2.
Applying a union bound, we conclude that the iterates contract at every iteration where ‖θt −
θPS‖2 > δwith probability at least 1−∑∞t=1 6ppi2t2 = 1−p. Therefore, for t > (1− 2εβγ )−1 log( ‖θ0−θPS‖2δ )
steps we have
‖θt −θPS‖2 6
(
2εβ
γ
)t
‖θ0 −θPS‖2 6
(
2εβ
γ
)t
‖θ0 −θPS‖2 6 exp
(
−t
(
1− 2εβ
γ
))
‖θ0 −θPS‖2 6 δ,
where we use 1− x 6 e−x. This implies that θt eventually contracts to a ball of radius δ around
θPS.
Case 2: ‖θt −θPS‖2 6 δ. We show that the RERM iterates can leave a ball of radius δ around
θPS only with negligible probability. We begin by applying the triangle inequality just as we did
in the previous case,
W1(Dnt (θt),D(θPS)) 6W1(Dnt (θt),D(θt)) +W1(D(θt),D(θPS)) 6W1(Dnt (θt),D(θt)) + εδ.
For our choice of nt, with probability at least 1− 6ppi2t2 this quantity is upper bounded by
W1(Dnt (θt),D(θPS)) 6 2εδ.
With this information, we can now apply the exact same steps as in the previous case, but now
using the fact that W1(Dnt (θt),D(θPS)) 6 2εδ instead of W1(Dnt (θt),D(θPS)) 6 2ε‖θt −θPS‖2, to
conclude that with probability at least 1− 6ppi2t2
‖θt+1 −θPS‖2 6 2ε βγ δ 6 δ.
As before, a union bound argument proves that the entire analysis holds with probability 1− p.
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Proof of (b): The only difference between part (b) in relation to part (a) is the fact that one
needs to invoke the steps of Theorem 3.8 rather than Theorem 3.5.
D.5 Proof of Proposition 4.1
We begin by defining the set-valued function, g(θ) = argminθ′∈ΘDPR(θ,θ′). Observe that fixed
points of this function correspond to classifiers which are performatively stable. The proof
thereby follows from showing that the function g(·) has a fixed point.
Since the loss is jointly continuous and the set Θ is compact, we can apply Berge’s Maximum
Theorem [5, 1] to conclude that the function g(·) is upper hemicontinuous with compact and
non-empty values. Furthermore, by convexity of the loss, it follows that in addition to being
compact and non-empty, g(θ) is a convex set for every θ ∈ Θ. Therefore, the conditions of
Kakutani’s Theorem [23] (also see Ch 17. in [1]) hold and we can conclude that g(·) has a fixed
point. Hence, a performatively stable classifier exists.
D.6 Proof of Proposition 4.2
We make a slight modification to Example 2.2 to prove the proposition. As in the example, D(θ)
is given as follows: X is a single feature supported on {±1} and Y | X ∼ Bernoulli(1/2+µX+εθX),
where Θ = [0,1]. We let ε > 12 , and constrain µ to satisfy |µ+ ε| 6 12 . We assume that outcomes
are predicted according to the model fθ(x) = θx+ 1/2 and that performance is measured via the
squared loss, `(z;θ) = (y − fθ(x))2. This loss has condition number βγ = 1.
A direct calculation demonstrates that the performative risk is a quadratic in θ:
PR(θ) =
1
4
− 2θµ+ (1− 2ε)θ2.
Therefore, if ε ∈
[
1
2 ,1
)
, the performative risk is a concave function of θ, even though ε < γβ .
D.7 Proof of Theorem 4.3
By definition of performative optimality and performative stability we have that:
DPR(θPO,θPO) 6DPR(θPS,θPS) 6DPR(θPS,θPO).
We claim that DPR(θPS,θPO) −DPR(θPS,θPS) > γ2 ‖θPO − θPS‖22. By definition of DPR, we can
write
DPR(θPS,θPO)−DPR(θPS,θPS) = E
Z∼D(θPS)
[
`(Z;θPO)− `(Z;θPS)
]
.
Since `(z;θPO) > `(z;θPS) +∇θ`(z;θPS)>(θPO −θPS) + γ2 ‖θPO −θPS‖22 for all z, we have that
E
Z∼D(θPS)
[
`(Z;θPO)− `(Z;θPS)
]
> E
Z∼D(θPS)
[
∇θ`(Z;θPS)>(θPO −θPS)
]
+
γ
2
‖θPO −θPS‖22. (8)
Now, by Lemma C.1, EZ∼D(θPS)
[
∇θ`(Z;θPS)>(θPO −θPS)
]
> 0, so we get that equation (8) implies
E
Z∼D(θPS)
[
`(Z;θPO)− `(Z;θPS)
]
>
γ
2
‖θPO −θPS‖22.
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Since the population distributions are ε-sensitive and the loss is Lz-Lipschitz in z, we have
that DPR(θPS,θPO) −DPR(θPO,θPO) 6 Lzε‖θPO − θPS‖2. If ε < γ‖θPO−θPS‖22Lz then we have that
Lzε‖θPO −θPS‖2 < γ2 ‖θPO −θPS‖22 which is a contradiction since it must hold that
DPR(θPS,θPO)−DPR(θPO,θPO) >DPR(θPS,θPO)−DPR(θPS,θPS).
D.8 Proof of Corollary 5.1
By Theorem 3.5 we know that repeated risk minimization converges at a linear rate to a
performatively stable point θPS. Furthermore, by Theorem 4.3, this performatively stable point
is close in domain to the institution’s Stackelberg equilibrium classifier θSE,
‖θSE −θPS‖2 6 2Lzεγ .
We can then use the fact that the loss is Lipschitz to show that this performatively stable classifier
is close in objective value to the Stackelberg equilibrium:
PR(θPS)−PR(θSE) 6
∣∣∣PR(θPS)−DPR(θPS,θSE)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣DPR(θPS,θSE)−PR(θSE)∣∣∣
6 Lθ‖θSE −θPS‖2 +Lzε‖θSE −θPS‖2
6
2Lzε(Lθ +Lzε)
γ
Here, we have used the Kantorovich-Rubinstein Lemma (C.3) to bound the second term.
E Approximately minimizing performative risk via regularization
Recall that in Proposition 3.6 we have shown that RRM might not converge at all if the objective
is smooth and convex, but not strongly convex. In this section, we show how adding a small
amount of quadratic regularization to the objective guarantees that RRM will converge to a
stable point which approximately minimizes the performative risk on the original loss.
To do so, we additionally require that the space of model parameters Θ be bounded with
diameter D = supθ,θ′∈Θ ‖θ −θ′‖2. We can assume without loss of generality that D = 1.
Proposition E.1. Suppose that the loss `(z;θ) is Lz-Lipschitz iz z and Lθ-Lipschitz in θ, β-jointly
smooth (A1) and convex (but not necessarily strongly convex). Furthermore, suppose that distribution
map D(·) is ε-sensitive with ε < 1, and that the set Θ is bounded with diameter 1. Then, there exists
a choice of α, such that running RRM with loss `reg(z;θ) def= `(z;θ) + α2 ‖θ − θ0‖22 converges to a
performatively stable point θregPS which satisfies the following
PR(θregPS ) 6minθ
PR(θ) +O
( √
ε
1− ε
)
.
We note that in the case where ε = 0, the limit point θregPS of regularized repeated risk
minimization is also performatively optimal.
31
Proof. First, we observe that the regularized loss function `reg(z;θ) is α-strongly convex and
α + β-jointly smooth. Since ε < 1, we can then choose an α such that ε < αα+β . In particular, we
choose α =
√
εβ/(1− ε).
From our choice of α, we have that ε is smaller than the inverse condition number. Hence,
by Theorem 3.5 repeated risk minimization converges at a linear rate to a performatively stable
solution θregPS of the regularized objective.
To finish the proof, we show that the objective value at the θregPS is close to the objective value
at the performative optima of the original objective θPO. We do so by bounding their difference
using the triangle inequality:
E
Z∼D(θregPS )
`reg(Z;θregPS )− EZ∼D(θPO)`(Z;θPO) = EZ∼D(θregPS )
`reg(Z;θregPS )− E
Z∼D(θregPO )
`reg(Z;θregPO )
+ E
Z∼D(θregPO )
`reg(Z;θregPO )− EZ∼D(θPO)`(Z;θPO)
We can bound the first difference via Lipschitzness:
E
Z∼D(θregPS )
`reg(Z;θregPS )− E
Z∼D(θregPO )
`reg(Z;θregPO ) = E
Z∼D(θregPS )
`reg(Z;θregPS )− E
Z∼D(θregPS )
`reg(Z;θregPO )
+ E
Z∼D(θregPS )
`reg(Z;θregPO )− E
Z∼D(θregPO )
`reg(Z;θregPO )
6 (Lθ +α sup
θ,θ′∈Θ
‖θ −θ′‖2)‖θregPS −θregPO‖2
+ εLz‖θregPS −θregPO‖2
= (Lθ +α + εLz)‖θregPS −θregPO‖2
6
2(Lθ +α + εLz)Lzε
α
.
In the last two lines, we have applied the fact that D = supθ,θ′∈Θ ‖θ−θ′‖2 = 1 as well as Theorem
4.3. For the second difference, by definition of performative optimality we have that,
E
Z∼D(θregPO )
`reg(Z;θregPO ) 6 EZ∼D(θPO)
`reg(Z;θPO) 6 E
Z∼D(θPO)
`(Z;θPO) +
α
2
.
Where we have again used the fact that D = 1 for the last inequality. Combining these two
together, we can bound the total difference:
E
Z∼D(θregPS )
`reg(Z;θregPS )− EZ∼D(θPO)`(Z;θPO) 6
2(Lθ +α + εLz)Lzε
α
+
α
2
.
Plugging in α =
√
εβ
1−ε completes the proof. 
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